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Humbug: Toward a Legal History
SUSANNA BLUMENTHAL†
INTRODUCTION
“Fraud is infinite.”1 So wrote Lord Hardwicke to Lord
Kames in a 1759 letter, opining that courts of equity could
not “lay down rules, how far they would go, and no farther”
without finding their jurisdiction “cramped, and perpetually
eluded by new schemes, which the fertility of man’s
invention would contrive.”2 The words of this jurist acquired
increasing currency in an era of dizzying commercial
development, finding their way into nineteenth-century
American as well as English legal discourse. They passed
from Joseph Story’s Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence
into the decisional law of several states,3 which was
recapitulated in treatises such as Melville Bigelow’s The
Law of Fraud, perpetuating the notion that the law had to
remain open-ended if fraudsters were to be brought to
† Professor of Law and Associate Professor of History, Co-Director of the
Program in Law and History, University of Minnesota. I thank Jack Schlegel
and Mark Fenster for organizing the conference on “Opportunities for Law’s
Intellectual History” where a portion of this Paper was presented, as well as the
participants assembled, who provided invaluable insights and inspiration. I am
also grateful to Ed Balleisen, Al Brophy, Laura Edwards, Jill Hasday, Martha
Jones, Paul Vaaler, and Barbara Welke for thoughtful suggestions and
criticisms and for the opportunity to present earlier versions of this Paper at the
Triangle Legal History Seminar, the Law School and the Carlson School of
Management at the University of Minnesota, and at a conference on White
Collar Crime in History at the German Historical Institute, co-sponsored by the
Said Business School at the University of Oxford.
1. JOSEPH PARKES, Correspondence of Lord Hardwicke and Lord Kames on
the Principles of Equity, in A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY; WITH
PRACTICAL REMARKS 501, 508 (1828).
2. Id.
3. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1836).
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justice.4 “Fraud is kaleidoscopic, infinite,” a Missouri judge
confirmed in a 1913 opinion, embellishing only slightly as
he reiterated the conventional judicial wisdom that “a hard
and fast definition” was neither possible nor desirable as a
matter of law.5 Without relieving the buyer of the
requirement to beware, he maintained that “there is a
boundary that may not be crossed” by sellers, though he
deliberately declined to say where it was: “[F]raud-feasors[ ]
would like nothing half so well as for courts to say they
would go thus far, and no further in its pursuit.”6
P. T. Barnum inadvertently illustrated this point in The
Humbugs of the World, his sprawling treatise/exposé of “the
tricks of the trade” comprising this “universal science.”7
Mimicking (if not mocking) the learned professors of his
day, he began with a disquisition on definitions, one that
made no mention of Hardwicke or any other legal authority,
but instead consulted the dictionary of “Doctor Webster.”8
There Barnum found humbug defined as “imposition under
fair pretences” when used as a noun, and as “to deceive; to
impose upon” when deployed as a verb. “With all due
deference,” he took exception to this entry because it might
be read to comprehend unlawful as well as lawful forms of
misrepresentation.9 Transparently seeking to clear humbug
of any implication of wrongdoing (not least because his
name had become synonymous with it),10 Barnum suggested
the term was most commonly understood to exclude “crimes
and arrant swindles.”11 He observed that a respectablelooking man who gained the confidence of another in order
4. MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, THE LAW
PERTAINING TO THE REDRESS THEREOF (1877).

OF

FRAUD

AND

THE

PROCEDURE

5. Stonemets v. Head, 154 S.W. 108, 114 (Mo. 1913).
6. Id. at 113-14.
7. P.T. BARNUM, The HUMBUGS OF THE WORLD, at vii (1866).
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id.
10. BLUFORD ADAMS, E. PLURIBUS BARNUM: THE GREAT SHOWMAN AND THE
MAKING OF U.S. POPULAR CULTURE (1997); BARNUM, supra note 7, at 7; JAMES W.
COOK, THE ARTS OF DECEPTION: PLAYING WITH FRAUD IN THE AGE OF BARNUM
(2001); NEIL HARRIS, HUMBUG: THE ART OF P.T. BARNUM (1973).
11. BARNUM, supra note 7, at 1.
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to pass a spurious draft or bank note was “justly called a
‘forger,’ or a ‘counterfeiter;’ and if arrested, he is punished
as such; but nobody thinks of calling him a ‘humbug.’”12 A
humbug did not impose with the intent to injure and he
might well be “an honest, upright man”13—a philanthropist,
even, if he shared the showman’s benevolent aim of
improving the minds and morals of his audience under the
cover of entertainment.14
Despite, or perhaps because of, these professions of good
faith, Barnum is often associated with the ethos of caveat
emptor. In biographies and broader cultural studies, he is
often taken to exemplify the creative deceptions enabled
and validated by the era’s “increasingly market-friendly
law.”15 A number of the new histories of capitalism, most
notably Jane Kamensky’s The Exchange Artist and Stephen
Mihm’s A Nation of Counterfeiters, have reinforced this
rendering of the legal landscape, leaving the impression
that police and prosecutors were overmatched by a wily
class of money-makers, who took full advantage of the
ambiguous borderlands “between capitalist enterprise and
criminal mischief.” The law and its enforcers most often
figure as flouted authorities in these accounts,
uncoordinated and ill-equipped to meet the challenges posed
by the confidence man in his various guises.16 Although
there is surely some truth to these characterizations, they
are too often uncritically based upon popular literature
ambivalently chronicling “the rogues and their rogueries”
and the published confessions/boasts of the swindlers
themselves. Put differently, the appearances of legal laxity
drawn from these sources are deceiving. Casting the
evidentiary net to encompass trial records, statute books,
treatises, appellate opinions and trial records as well as
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. at 10.
14. See COOK, supra note 10, at 22-23; HARRIS, supra note 10, at 214-31.
15. COOK, supra note 10, at 114.
16. JANE KAMENSKY, THE EXCHANGE ARTIST: A TALE OF HIGH-FLYING
SPECULATION AND AMERICA’S FIRST BANKING COLLAPSE (2008); STEPHEN MIHM, A
NATION OF COUNTERFEITERS: CAPITALISTS, CON MEN, AND THE MAKING OF THE
UNITED STATES 106 (2007).
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trade journals, newspapers, novels, and other cultural
forms, this Paper is part of a broader investigation into the
modes of regulation—public and private, formal and
informal, federal, state, and local—that Americans deployed
as they reckoned with the problem of deceit over the course
of the long nineteenth century. Rightly apprehended,
Barnum was an integral part of this endeavor. In
attempting to write humbug out of the law of fraud, the
showman was certainly playing with its indeterminacy. But
he was also invested in establishing himself as a legitimate
sort of imposter, the purveyor of a valuable and edifying
form of amusement.17 The Humbugs of the World was, in a
sense, the homage he paid to The Law of Fraud. Upon closer
inspection, it becomes clear that the play in the law was
often a source of its strength because it enabled public and
private prosecutors to keep pace with and sometimes make
like the malefactors they endeavored to bring to justice.
Although there is no gainsaying the institutional limitations
that hampered such enforcement efforts, which were surely
rendered peculiarly challenging in a culture that valorized
entrepreneurial ingenuity and preached the virtue of
looking sharp, the evidence on this score hardly warrants
the conclusion that the enterprises of capitalists and
criminals were practically indistinguishable in this
burgeoning market society. Operating in the shadow of a
legal system that distributed regulatory powers to a
widening network of municipal, state, and federal officials;
relying all the while upon the vigilance of private citizens
and the popular press as well as the self-policing of a host of
trade associations; Americans tested the meaning of the law
of fraud daily, whether they knew it or not.18
17. See COOK, supra note 10, at 260-62; HARRIS, supra note 10, at 215-31.
18. On the obsessive concern about fraud and imposture within the middleclass culture of the nineteenth century, see, for example, ELAINE S. ABELSON,
WHEN LADIES GO A-THIEVING: MIDDLE-CLASS SHOPLIFTERS IN THE VICTORIAN
DEPARTMENT STORE (1989); COOK, supra note 10; KATHLEEN DE GRAVE,
SWINDLER, SPY, REBEL: THE CONFIDENCE WOMAN IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1995); ANN FABIAN, CARD SHARPS, DREAM BOOKS, & BUCKET SHOPS:
GAMBLING IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990); KAREN HALTTUNEN, CONFIDENCE
MEN AND PAINTED LADIES: A STUDY OF MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA,
1830–1870 (1982); JOHN KASSON, RUDENESS AND CIVILITY: MANNERS IN
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The contours of this normative universe can be
reconstructed most readily and effectively by retracing the
steps of the shifty characters who did not get away, but who
were placed on trial along with their impostures in
courtrooms and the popular press that represented these
events to an ever more expansive, transatlantic audience. In
what follows, I focus on a single criminal case: the
sensational forgery trial of Charles B. Huntington, a Wall
Street broker who was tried and convicted of this offense in
1856, illustrating how and why it ought to be taken as a
critical juncture in fraud’s intellectual history as David
Hollinger has defined the focal point of the field: the
historical acts “of people who ‘made history’ by arguing.”19
The judge, lawyers, witnesses, and newsmen who
participated in this legal spectacle may be taken to fit this
description and they have left behind a rich documentary
basis for reflecting more generally upon the problematics of
writing a legal history of humbug, ultimately going to show
that capturing fraud was a funny business in Barnum’s
America.20
NINETEENTH-CENTURY URBAN AMERICA (1990); JACKSON LEARS, FABLES OF
ABUNDANCE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICA (1994); R.
LAURENCE MOORE, IN SEARCH OF WHITE CROWS: SPIRITUALISM, PARAPSYCHOLOGY,
AND AMERICAN CULTURE (1977). Although some attention has been drawn to the
regulation of fraud, see MICHAEL PETTIT, THE SCIENCE OF DECEPTION:
PSYCHOLOGY AND COMMERCE IN AMERICA (2013); RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED:
THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2011). Only
recently has law been made a central focus. See Edward J. Balleisen, Private
Cops on the Fraud Beat: The Limits of Self-Regulation, 1895-1932, 83 BUS. HIST.
REV. 113, 128-32, 144-48 (2009); Robert E. Mensel, “A Diddle at Brobdingnag”:
Confidence and Caveat Emptor During the Market Revolution, 38 U. MEM. L.
REV. 97, 117-27 (2007). For valuable doctrinal studies, see KIM LANE SCHEPPELE,
LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW (1982); Paula
Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 405 (1995).
19. David A. Hollinger, “What is Our ‘Canon’? How American Intellectual
Historians Debate the Core of their Field, 9 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 185, 187 (2012).
20. See, e.g., id. Law remains a relatively understudied aspect of studies of
the intellectual life of the United States and the same may be said of the newest
histories of capitalism; while scholars writing in this vein insist that capitalism
be understood as a “knowledge economy” as well as a mode of production, they
have yet to accord systematic attention to the role of legal institutions,
practices, and professionals in the capitalist transformation of the nineteenth
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I. THE CRIME OF FORGERY
The arrest of Charles B. Huntington on the charge of
forgery in early October 1856 quickly became the talk of the
town. It was said to be “the chief theme of conversation, not
only in Wall street, among the bulls and bears, but among
all classes of the community,” both within and far beyond
the city, owing in no small part to an entrepreneurial press.
Indeed, his arrest touched off something of a media circus,
as reporters rivaled each other in their daily disclosures
about “The Great Wall Street Forgery Case.” Although the
initial charge against this Wall Street broker was based
upon a single note for $6500, readers were assured this was
but a small specimen of the hundreds of thousands of
dollars of “spurious paper” he had put into circulation.
Presuming the guilt of “HUNTINGTON THE
FORGER,” newspapers reconstructed this criminal’s
biography, painting a portrait of creative self-destruction, of
a villain as hapless as he was audacious, his capacity for
self-delusion proving infectious, as it seemed to inspire
others to confide in him. Although the accused was an
unknown quantity when he set up shop in a basement Wall
Street office in 1847, possessing neither friends nor capital,
he nonetheless managed to obtain sizable loans rather
readily from the most “responsible” and “respectable” of
firms. Offering a combination of forged and genuine notes as
collateral, he endeavored to redeem them before their
maturity so as to “conceal the fraudulent modus operandi by
which he effected his designs.” Huntington’s success was not
easily attributed to his skill and circumspection. Many of
the forged notes Huntington passed contained signatures
that “did not even pretend to be imitations” and he spent
the money he had made by living extravagantly in plain
sight. Indeed, Huntington was the most conspicuous of
consumers, famously addicted to the finest cigars, fastest
horses, and prettiest women that money could buy; he was
also well-known for hosting ostentatious parties at one of
century. See generally CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Michael Zakim & Gary J.
Kornblith eds., 2012).
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two ridiculously over-furnished houses he leased in lower
Manhattan to provide separate living spaces for his family
and a lady friend who was not his wife. Therein lay the
puzzle for many a newsman and presumably his readers as
well: why did it take so long for this unabashed doubledealer to be apprehended as such?21
The perplexity only deepened as the case was set for
trial. Huntington retained the services of the veteran trial
attorney James Brady, and maintained an air of
nonchalance in the meantime, enjoying the “sumptuous
fare” his fashionable wife dutifully brought every evening to
his well-appointed cell at the Tombs. Huntington’s reticence
on the advice of counsel excited debate about whether a
financier (or, for that matter, a lawyer) could be
distinguished from a fraudster. The editor of the New York
Daily News strenuously argued against any sweeping
generalizations and insisted that “the exposure of such
reckless rogues” as Huntington “need excite no alarm of
uneasiness as to the rectitude of the commercial
community” because he was “a mere vulgar forger” whose
“operations were confined solely to his own use.” Truly great
swindlers were said to be few and far between, constituting
“mere specks upon the sun” who “ought to be looked upon
with surprise on account of their rarity” and taken as
negative examples, for they were sure to be “regarded as
poor sneaks when detected, and very soon forgotten when
they received the sentence which is sure, sooner or later, to
be pronounced upon them.”22
This complacency was echoed in the financial press but
it was far from dominant in the public sphere. The daily
dispatches of the New York Herald were more
representative of the pretrial publicity in treating
Huntington’s “unbounded extravagance” as a distressing
sign of the times. His “career” was likened in these pages to
“a display of fireworks—brilliant, but evanescent,”
effectively “throwing a great deal of light on the operations
21. See The Great Wall Street Forgery Case, FARMER’S CABINET, Oct. 30, 1856,
at 3; The New York Forgeries, AUGUSTA CHRON., Oct. 17, 1856, at 2.
22. Splendid Roguery, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1856 at 4; cf. The Recent Frauds
in Wall Street, J. COMMERCE, reprinted in CHARLESTON MERCURY, Oct. 15, 1856.
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of men of money in Wall Street and the neighborhood” and
portending the moral and financial downfall of the nation as
a whole. “In this age of fast living,” went the repeated
refrain, “there is no time to regard social morality or look
beneath the surface to find out whether our reputed
millionaires and famous financiers have any solid
foundation for their pretensions.” This willful blindness
enabled a man like Huntington to set up “his shingle anew”
in New York City even after he was captured and indicted
on a forgery charge in Washington D.C. “with all due
publicity.” If anything, Huntington’s brush with the law
seemed to enhance his credit-worthiness within the
financial world, winning him the “unlimited confidence of
his brother sharpers.” It was lamentably the norm among
members of this “codfish aristocracy” to discount bills
suspected to be forgeries at usurious rates, thus implicating
them “morally, if not legally” in Huntington’s crime. “This,
perhaps, is the cause which deters some of the negotiators
from stepping forward as prosecutors,” conjectured one
reporter, “although there are others doubtless who object
simply to appear in the character of dupes.” Those who had
accepted Huntington’s bogus notes as security were
regrettably but predictably more concerned with avoiding
guilt or embarrassment by association than bringing this
“vulgar” forger to justice.23
Hours before Huntington was to be tried in a
Manhattan courtroom on the first of twenty-seven
indictments in mid-December, “the swarm of curiosity
seekers had overflowed into the corridor, and dripping down
the stairs, had formed a large human note of interrogation.”
This attested to the trial’s status as “a case of public
interest,” observed District Attorney A. Oakey Hall in his
opening argument, which he began by simply reading the
indictment and offering some etymological musings about
another crime, one that had taken place in the realm of
ideas:
23. See The Cause of Financial Revolutions, N.Y. HERALD, Oct. 18, 1856, at 4;
The Huntington Forgeries, N.Y. HERALD, Oct. 25, 1856, at 4; see also Forgeries,
FARMER’S CABINET, Nov. 11, 1856, at 2 (reprinting excerpts from a New York
Herald article).
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Now it is very singular, and something which eminently
challenges the attention of the legal scholar, to know when and
how and why the encyclopedia of criminal law robbed the
dictionary of honest labor of the word FORGERY. You will not be
able to find why and wherefore that the spendthrift sitting at his
desk in secret—in self-imposed exile from the social community—
alone with his crimes and his vices, should do that according to
the nomenclature of the law, which the arm of honest labor does
as it strikes upon the anvil—forge—forgery! And yet through
many years it has come down to us to mean that worst, that
meanest, that most despicable of all commercial lies which a man
can tell, or which a man can make,—a black lie and a white lie at
the same time.24

This was an ingenious rhetorical move, shoring up a
producerism ethos that likely resonated with the twelve
men empanelled to hear the case, drawn as they were from
the middling classes of the burgeoning market society.25 It
was also a point well taken from an etymological
standpoint: forgery does indeed have a long and tangled
linguistic association with fraud and its ilk. Historians of
Anglo-American law who have had recourse to
encyclopedias and dictionaries as well as other forms of
evidence have since traced out these linguistic connections,
identifying the Renaissance as the era in which the concept
of forgery was first “abstracted from the concrete world” of
iron forgers and “appl[ied] to the mind’s creative faculties.”26
24. JAMES A. BRADY & JOHN A. BRYAN, TRIAL OF CHARLES B. HUNTINGTON FOR
FORGERY: PRINCIPAL DEFENCE: INSANITY 24 (1857). American law writers
commonly drew this connection, many quoting Coke: “‘To forge . . . is
metaphorically taken from the smith, who beateth upon his anvil, and forgeth
what fashion or shape he will. The offence is called crimen falsi, and the
offender falsarius; and the Latin word to forge is falsare or fabricare. And this is
properly taken when the act is done in the name of another person.” James
Wilson, Lectures on Law, reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES
WILSON, L.L.D. 52 (Lorenzo Press 1804).
25. The published trial record includes a transcript of the empaneling of the
jury and a list of the names, occupations, and addresses of those selected; the
foreman was identified as an umbrella and parasol manufacturer, two others as
dry goods merchants, and the remaining men as follows: commission merchant,
soap maker, boot and shoe maker, umbrella manufacturer, wig-maker, liquor
store merchant, music teacher, broker, and sash and blind maker. BRADY &
BRYAN, supra note 24, at 20.
26. IAN HAYWOOD, THE ART AND POLITICS OF FORGERY 6 (1987).
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Used in this sense, the word connoted a fabrication that was
at once “imitative and original” and yet not necessarily
fraudulent or designed to deceive. Though often carrying
with it the dual signification of licit and illicit production, it
could also refer to the work of God, He being the “forgere of
alle thingus.”27 The early modern period witnessed a
“hardening of the metaphor,” however, as the figure of the
forger increasingly came to be identified with a “producer of
false documents,” a development reflected and reinforced by
statutory enactments periodically expanding the range of
private as well as public instruments and records subject to
legal regulation and ratcheting up the criminal penalties
attaching to the forgery of them.28
At common law, the crime of forgery was defined as “the
fraudulent making or altering of a writing to the prejudice
of another man’s right” and the severity of punishment
turned upon the nature of the document that had been
falsified.29 Whereas the making of a false royal charter and
the counterfeiting of the king’s money or seal were both
considered capital offenses, the forgery of deeds, wills, and
other private documents was punishable by lesser penalties,
ranging from fines and the pillory to mutilation, outlawry,
and imprisonment. This hierarchy of wrongdoing was
likewise observed in statutory provisions enacted in the
later medieval and early modern period. The more
important written documents came to be in the world of
commerce, the more members of Parliament felt moved to
strengthen the legal deterrents against forgery and extend
them to financial instruments. Intended to serve as both a
shaming device and a means of publicizing the offender’s
betrayal, this penalty scheme armed judges with a flexible

27. ALFRED HIATT, THE MAKING OF MEDIEVAL FORGERIES: FALSE DOCUMENTS IN
FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 28 (2004).
28. Id. See generally Randall McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows: The
Punishment of Forgery in the Age of Financial Revolution, 165 PAST & PRESENT
107 (1999) [hereinafter McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows].
29. Randall McGowen, Making the ‘Bloody Code’? Forgery Legislation in
Eighteenth-Century England, in LAW, CRIME AND ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1660–1830,
at 117, 121 (Norma Landau, ed., 2002).
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means of combatting new forms of deceit enabled by
changing modes of economic activity.30
Such provisions nonetheless pale in comparison to the
legislative attention drawn to the problem of forgery over
the course of the long eighteenth century, a period that saw
the addition of hundreds of new forgery provisions to the
books, many inflicting the penalty of death.31 Long cast as
the key exemplars of England’s “bloody code,” this explosion
of legislation has come to be understood as part of the
nation’s monetary policy, registering growing concern about
abuses of trust among private parties. “The crime of forgery
is so enormous in itself, and so destructive of the mercantile
interest,” prosecutors repeatedly argued, “that it ought to be
discouraged in a trading nation, beyond almost any other
crime.”32 This way of thinking about—if not exactly on
behalf of—the commercial class was codified in a sweeping
1729 statute that rendered the forgery of “any deed, will,
testament, bond, writing obligatory, bill of exchange,
promissory note for payment of money, indorsement or
assignment of any bill of exchange, or promissory note for
the payment of goods” a capital offense, one that was rarely
pardoned.33

30. See HIATT, supra note 27, at 26-27; McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows,
supra note 28, at 121-23. On the “reinvention” of money in England at the end of
the seventeenth century, see CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN,
CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM 11-12 (2014).
31. See generally Carl Wennerlind, The Death Penalty as Monetary Policy:
The Practice of Punishment of Monetary Crime, 1690–1830, 36 HIST. POL. ECON.
131 (2004).
32. McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows, supra note 28, at 136.
33. V. A. C. GATTRELL, THE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION AND THE ENGLISH
PEOPLE, 1770–1868 (1996); McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows, supra note 27, at
128, 136; Wennerlind, supra note 31, at 131; cf. PETER LINEBAUGH, THE LONDON
HANGED: CRIME AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1992). It has
been estimated that one out of every three forgers was executed in the last
quarter of the eighteenth century, as compared with less than one half of those
convicted of burglary and highway robbery. See CLIVE EMSLEY, CRIME AND
SOCIETY IN ENGLAND, 1750–1900 (1996). On the cultural representations of
forgers, see LINCOLN B. FALLER, TURNED TO ACCOUNT: THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS
OF CRIMINAL BIOGRAPHY IN LATE SEVENTEENTH- AND EARLY EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND 192 (1987).
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Yet the severity of this new wave of statutes
undermined their efficacy. As they were invoked, attention
was redirected from the offense to the offender in popular
discourse, exciting sympathy from the reading public. This
was in no small part owing to the social identity of those
who were tried and convicted of this crime, for they were
typically drawn from the middling classes and seemed to
have succumbed to the temptation of forgery in a moment of
weakness brought on by financial failure and an anxious
desire to provide for their family and preserve their
respectable status.34 Although sentencing judges tended to
treat the status of offenders as an aggravating factor, others
saw them as products of their environment, symptomatic of
“an overheated City culture that robbed people of their
social moorings” and led them to “confuse the illusion with
the real substance won by hard work and scrupulous
conduct.” Journalists and pamphleteers put these ideas into
circulation, accentuating the elements of misfortune that
conspired against the condemned criminals and mourning
the lost potential: “Mr. Smith had [t]alents, and a [g]enius,
that might not only have secured him from the
[t]emptations of [w]ant, but that, if properly applied, and
accompanied with [i]ndustry, [h]onesty, and [a]pplication,
might have rendered him a useful [m]ember of [s]ociety, and
enabled him to live in [a]ffluence.”35
The moral ambiguity of such portraits reflected and
reinforced critiques of England’s capital laws. As early as
1765, Blackstone was identifying the “multitude of
sanguinary laws” lately passed by Parliament as indicative
of a national “distemper,” deeming it to be “a kind of
quackery in government . . . to apply the same universal
remedy, the ultimum supplicium, to every case of
difficulty.”36 Drawing strength from such professional
34. See, e.g., Randall McGowen, Forgery Discovered: Or the Perils of
Circulation in Eighteenth-Century England, 1 ANGELAKI, no. 2, 1996, at 113-18.
35. See DONNA T. ANDREW & RANDALL MCGOWEN, THE PERREAUS AND MRS.
DODD: FORGERY AND BETRAYAL IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LONDON (2001); Randall
McGowen, Forgers and Forgery: Severity and Social Identity in EighteenthCentury England, in MORAL PANICS, THE MEDIA AND THE LAW IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND 157 (David Lemmings and Claire Walker eds., 2009).
36. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *17.
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misgivings, as well as those expressed in the popular press,
reformers singled out the capital sanctions for forgery as
especially misguided innovations of an incompetent
legislature that were “anachronistic and out of line with the
habits and sensibilities of the people,” rendering them
especially difficult to enforce without arbitrariness and
great expense.37 Appearing far more concerned about the
brutalizing effects of the scaffold on the lower classes who
witnessed the hangings of forgers than the offense itself,
they advocated more “enlightened” principles of
proportionality and sought to institute a new disciplinary
regime that governed by sympathy and self-interest rather
than example and terror, a regime built on the psychological
premise that “compassion begets confidence.” Successfully
mobilizing public opinion by means of a petition campaign
that boasted the signatures of hundreds of bankers,
merchants, and other “practical” men, they ultimately
secured the repeal of most of the capital forgery statutes in
1830, marking a significant juncture in the transition from
“the gallows to the prison”38 in the history of punishment.39
Across the Atlantic, Americans had grown accustomed
to improvising where matters of currency and law
enforcement were concerned. By the time of the Revolution
many had developed a strong aversion to centralized
governmental control of monetary policy and an even
greater abhorrence of sanguinary punishments. Speciestarved, American colonists placed their faith in paper
37. Phil Handler, Forgery and the End of the ‘Bloody Code’ in Early
Nineteenth-Century England, 48 HIST. J. 683, 686 (2005).
38. Randall McGowen, The Body and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century
England, 59 J. MOD. HIST. 651, 678 (1987) [hereinafter McGowen, The Body of
Punishment].
39. See GATTRELL, supra note 33; Randall McGowen, A Powerful Sympathy:
Terror, the Prison, and Humanitarian Reform in Early Nineteenth-Century
Britain, 25 J. BRIT. STUD. 312, 312-14 (1986); Randall McGowen, Managing the
Gallows: The Bank of England and the Death Penalty, 1797–1821, 25 LAW &
HIST. REV 241 (2007); McGowen, The Body of Punishment, supra note 38, at 67478; cf. Douglas Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S
FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17-63
(Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975) (examining the increase in death penalty
statutes).
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money out of necessity; provincial legislatures began issuing
bills of credit from the end of the seventeenth century
forward with the intent of stimulating trade, as well as the
knowledge that they were enabling fraud, given the
dizzying array of notes and coins that were in circulation by
the 1740s. Efforts on the part of imperial authorities to put
an end to the colonies’ emissions of paper currency in the
second half of the century were arguably most effective in
fomenting political rebellion. All the while, full-fledged
counterfeiters proliferated, organizing into gangs and plying
their trade with relative ease since it was fairly easy to
break out of jail and flee to another colony to begin anew.
The penalties attaching to the crime varied from a fine to
death across jurisdictions that were either unable or
disinclined to coordinate with one another.40 Offenders who
were caught and tried faced ambivalent juries who tended
to regard them with varying mixtures of anger and
admiration, some regarding their property offenses as
conferring a public benefit of sorts, insofar as it increased
the money supply.41 Fighting a losing battle against such
outlaws in 1773, New York Assemblyman Phillip Schuyler
proposed that a new run of bills be issued with imagery
designed to deter such activity:
an eye in a cloud, a cart and coffins, three felons on a gallows, a
weeping father and mother, with several small children, a burning
pit, human figures being forced into it by fiends, a label with the
words “Let the name of a Money Maker rot,” and such other
additions as the commissioners might think proper.42

The deterrent effect of these paper threats may well be
doubted, given the proliferation of fake notes in this period,
some even announcing their illicit status by way of obvious
errors, with telling misspellings like “COUUTERFEIT.”43
40. See KENNETH SCOTT, COUNTERFEITING IN COLONIAL AMERICA 9-10 (1957);
Steven C. Bullock, A Mumper Among the Gentle: Tom Bell, Colonial Confidence
Man, 55 WM. & MARY Q. 231, 231-58 (1998).
41. See SCOTT, supra note 40, at 11.
42. Id.
43. KAMENSKY, supra note 16; MIHM, supra note 16, at 41; SCOTT, supra note
40, at 6-7.
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The moneymakers who may have posed the greatest danger
to the American colonies were those who were working for
the British government during the Revolutionary War.
Seizing the main chance as the Continental Congress and
individual colonies emitted ever more currency to fund their
war efforts, John Bull took to counterfeiting, thereby
perpetrating a form of economic warfare which contributed
significantly to the depreciation of the wartime paper
money known as “continentals,” a word that became
synonymous with worthlessness over the course of this
imperial conflict.44
This experience crucially shaped the way newly
liberated Americans thought about paper currency and its
counterfeits. Reflecting a hard-money bias, the framers of
the Constitution prohibited states from emitting “bills of
credit” and making “anything but Gold or Silver Coin a
Tender in Payment of Debts,” which fostered the growth of
state-chartered banks of varying degrees of reputability,
some being stringently regulated by requirements as to
species reserves, and others allowed to issue notes with
abandon. They were joined by the Bank of the United
States, authorized by Congress in 1791, though the charter
was allowed to expire in 1811 amid lingering doubts about
its constitutionality sown by opponents of federal attempts
to control the money supply. At the same time, not only
state but also state-chartered banks were instituted,
catering to “most every special interest or class”—
tradesmen, farmers, artisans, among others—and the notes
they issued were famously easy to counterfeit.45 This
prompted a new coalition of bankers and legislators, with
the support of President James Madison, to secure the
chartering of the Second Bank of the United States in 1816,
arguing that it would protect the people from forgers as well
as irresponsible bank managers in the several states—in
other words, from “legal and illegal counterfeiters of
money.” Yet precisely because the notes of the Second Bank
promised to provide a uniform national currency, which
would circulate at par across the land, they became the
44. See SCOTT, supra note 40, at 253-63.
45. See MIHM, supra note 16, at 41-43, 74.
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prime target of counterfeiters who were not easily
combatted, particularly as President Andrew Jackson rose
to power and took aim at the “monster,” joining forces with
a new generation of renegade bankers who resented federal
control, together bringing about its demise by 1834.46
Jackson’s removal of federal deposits and subsequent
actions to eradicate the “paper system” of banking—
animated by what his opponents called the “Gold
Humbug”—resulted in financial chaos, as state banks grew
exponentially, so that there were nearly six hundred such
entities in operation by 1837, a crisis point in the nation’s
economy, inaugurating a period of panic and depression of
unprecedented proportions that inspired the creation of a
new form of currency—“shinplasters”—that were printed in
fractions of dollars by individuals and businesses desperate
to find a way forward amidst the rubble of failed banks and
their now valueless notes. Although these were
emphatically not authorized by any state, the liberty to
make money was soon given a sort of legal cover with the
enactment of “free banking laws” in a number of states,
including New York, which allowed anyone who could raise
a specified amount of capital to incorporate as a noteissuing bank. Thus the “Bank Wars” of Jacksonian America
stand as illustrations of “the strange yet revealing
intermingling of counterfeiting, capitalism, and democratic
politics” on Mihm’s account, signaling “a growing tolerance
for illicit money-making of all kinds” and ushering in a
period in which “a new generation of criminal capitalists
could operate with impunity.”47
In no place was this truer than antebellum New York
City. Or so Mihm suggests in his remarkable reconstruction
of the criminal underworld of forgers and passers of bogus
currency who almost always managed to stay a step ahead
of policemen in this burgeoning urban center.48 “Confronted
with crumbling categories,” Mihm observes, “many
shopkeepers, merchants, retailers, and other money
46. Id. at 110-11, 132, 144.
47. Id. at 155.
48. Id. at 95, 102, 149-56.
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handlers abandoned the quest for certainty, substituting in
its place a corrupt pragmatism” and adopting the “informal
credo” that a “well-crafted imitation on a reputable bank”
was better than “a genuine issue of a bad bank.” Yet his
rendering of the “counterfeit economy” that flourished in
this era is largely based upon the surviving court records of
criminal trials, which raises questions about whether this
period did indeed witness the “obliteration” of “the divide
between the counterfeit and the real.” Although some
attention is drawn to the governing statutes, their
application in the common run of cases is not systematically
explored. The reader is instead left with the impression that
the law’s enforcers were simply overmatched by a wily
counterfeiting class, whose members made accomplices of
almost everyone else by the middle decades of the
nineteenth century. While drawing attention to privately
produced “counterfeit detectors,” which were published by
self-appointed
(and
self-interested)
“arbiter[s]
of
authenticity” and designed to protect merchants against
imposition, Mihm does not explore the decisional law
produced by those with the legal authority to apprehend
and punish perpetrators of fraud.49 To be sure, police forces,
jails, and other institutional mechanisms for redressing
financial crimes were skeletal when measured by today’s
standards, or even those that prevailed in the aftermath of
the Civil War. But in focusing on those who evaded or
openly defied the law, Mihm does not fully capture the
complex public and private modes of regulating
moneymaking in the period before the federal issuance of
Greenbacks and creation of the Secret Service which
fundamentally changed the stakes of counterfeiting.50
Returning to the antebellum courtroom where
Huntington was called to account for his forgery, for his
utterance of “a black lie and a white lie at the same time,”
enables us to see that the permissiveness of the law has
been significantly overstated.51 To be sure, revolutionary
American statesmen endeavored to reduce the sanctions
49. Id. at 210-58.
50. See BRADY & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 24.
51. See id.
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attaching to this crime, a move intended to express “the
special character of justice in the fledgling American
republics.”52 Indeed, the earliest state constitutions
articulated
“enlightened”
ideals
of
proportionality
understood to entail revision of the sanguinary laws of their
English ancestors. “No wise legislature will affix the same
punishment to crimes of theft, forgery, and the like, which
they do to those of murder and treason,” pronounced the
New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, averring that “where
the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all
offenses the people are led to forget the real distinction in
the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant
with as little compunction as they do those of the lightest
dye.”53 Yet such sentiments were not immediately
operationalized in criminal codes and the removal of the
capital sanction hardly signaled the dawning of an era of
toleration for forgers. To the contrary, the reformers were
primarily concerned with putting an end to the public
exhibitions of “counterfeit contrition” staged whenever such
wrongdoers were about to be hanged and working instead to
inspire more genuine forms of repentance within the
confines of penitentiaries.54 Federal and state criminal codes
contained extensive provisions delineating various classes of
crime—including counterfeiting, debasing the coinage,
passing bad coins, forging public securities, bank notes, and
others sorts of financial instruments—and they also
prescribed norms of economic behavior, more than a few
retaining prohibitions of usury, though this was mainly
enforced by means of civil sanctions. Criminal penalties
prescribed for forgery and counterfeiting (words often
52. JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY
FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT (2012); STEVEN WILF, LAW’S IMAGINED
REPUBLIC: POPULAR POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA
148 (2010).
AND THE

53. WILF, supra note 52, at 146-48.
54. See MELVILLE BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FRAUD (1888);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 73-74,
111 (1993); LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776–1865, at 82 (1989); Kathryn
Preyer, Crime, the Criminal Law and Reform in Post-Revolutionary Virginia, 1
LAW & HIST. REV. 53, 59-73 (1983).
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treated as synonymous) ranged from death (under federal
law) to prison terms (the typical range being from three to
twenty years) to fines. Judges and jurists gave meaning to
these statutory provisions in elaborately written opinions
and treatises that underscored the infinitude of fraud,
complicating any effort to reconstruct historically what
constituted the law of case.55
In refusing to state any hard and fast rule, the
expositors of the law of fraud effectively took their
operations under cover. As problematic as they
acknowledged this to be in a political culture that placed
such a high premium on the clarity and comprehensiveness
of their criminal codes, antebellum American lawmakers
acknowledged that they would have to be as cunning as
moneymakers if they were to succeed in capturing them.56
This is not, however, to suggest that the law on the
books did not matter. To the contrary, it provides an
essential starting point for making sense of Huntington’s
ultimate fate. The indictment was based upon Section 33 of
New York’s Criminal Code, which had been revised several
years before his trial to read:
Every person who, with intent to injure or defraud, shall falsely
make, alter, forge or counterfeit, (1) [a]ny instrument or writing,
being, or purporting to be . . . (2) . . . the act of another, by which
any pecuniary demand or obligation shall be, or shall purport to
55. See, e.g., OLIVER LORENZO BARBOUR, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
STATE OF NEW YORK; AND UPON THE JURISDICTION, DUTY, AND AUTHORITY OF
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, AND INCIDENTALLY, OF THE POWER AND DUTY OF SHERIFFS,
CONSTABLES, & IN CRIMINAL CASES (2d ed. 1852); TIMOTHY WALKER, Introduction
to AMERICAN LAW: DESIGNED AS A FIRST BOOK FOR STUDENTS 142-51, 406-08, 47677, 480-81, 484-86 (1837); 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1-66, 242-85, 470-73 (1868). In antebellum New
York, the legal rate of interest was set at 7% (other states ranged from 6%–8%)
and usurious contracts were unenforceable (other states imposed financial
penalties, some legislating forfeiture of the principal, some that of the interest,
others setting the penalty at two or three times the usury). See HOWARD
BODENHORN, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AN ERA OF NATION-BUILDING 147
(2000).
THE

56. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1774–1970, at 151-72 (1973). But see Roy Kreitner, Legal History of
Money, 8 ANN. REV. SOC. SCI. 415, 417-18 (2012).
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be, created, increased, discharged . . . [b]y which false making,
forging, altering or counterfeiting, any person may be affected,
bound, or in any way injured in his person and property . . . shall
be adjudged guilty of forgery in the third degree. 57

This offense carried with it a maximum sentence of five
years in prison. In the revisers’ notes they remarked that
“the offense of passing counterfeit bills is perhaps the most
frequent of any presented to our criminal courts” and
further observed that it typically involved
two very distinct classes of offenders; one, consisting of the actual
bold forger or his associate; the other, consisting of the duped and
ignorant citizen, who, although suspicious of a bill that he has
received, yet gets rid of it, on the first opportunity. The latter,
though highly criminal, is not of the same deep depravity of the
former.

This perceived difference in the degree of culpability was
most clearly registered in “the reluctance of juries to convict
in the latter case, and thus expose such persons to the very
severe penalties of the law.” Accordingly, the revisers had
carefully crafted a lesser offense for possessing or uttering
any forged or counterfeit instrument that had been
innocently acquired, for which the maximum prison
sentence was two years, this being deemed to be better
“proportioned to the actual guilt.”58
Yet none of the other note brokers with whom
Huntington dealt were prosecuted under this section, nor
was the foolishness of his victims in taking his notes of any
legal significance in the estimation of the district attorney;
the duped men were likened to “the theologian [who]
sometimes hugs the false to his bosom, and rejects the true
because ignorant of it.” They were not to be blamed for
trusting the defendant, for confidence was “the very life and
essence of commerce” and they had no choice but to believe
what they were told; in doing so, they were “merely obeying
every dictate of charity—not to judge others lest we should
be judged ourselves.” Placing Huntington’s crimes on par
57. 2 THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Part IV, Ch. I, tit. 3,
art. 3, § 33(1)-(2) (Packard & Van Benthuysen 1836).
58. BARBOUR, supra note 55, at 111.
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with the most violent of offenses—“[t]his man has stabbed
at the commercial reputation of men you and I have an
interest in. He has inflicted a blow on the people of New
York”—the threat to the moral integrity of “this great
commercial metropolis” was localized in him. Glossing over
evidence that his notes were clumsy fakes, Hall endeavored
to persuade the jurors that the prisoner was as devious as
he was depraved, operating in accordance with “the most
wide awake and shrewd method” and animated by “a sort of
moral insanity that seemed to have seized him.”59
This would prove to be an unfortunate choice of words.
For the defense team, headed by the virtuoso trial attorney
James T. Brady, agreed that their client was morally
insane, documenting a life history of destructive behavior
and business failure that supported this medical hypothesis,
which was made the basis of their argument for acquittal.
They did so over Huntington’s manifest objection, uttered in
open court: “A splendid farce this! A capital joke by gad!”
Most news editors immediately echoed his sentiments,
generously heaping ridicule on this suspect means of
dodging criminal responsibility. To claim that the tendency
to develop and advance “ridiculous schemes to get rich
without labor” was “a token of insanity” was to argue for the
legal irresponsibility of men like P. T. Barnum (whose
operations were wilder than anything Huntington had ever
dreamed up) and embolden knaves everywhere to “make
such a dash at crime as to astonish the world and attract its
admiration, so that, if money not buy a release, the very
boldness of the crime will acquit the ground of insanity.”60
II. COUNTERFEITING INSANITY
When Huntington’s lawyers dropped the bombshell of
the insanity defense in courtroom, District Attorney Hall
must have felt like the joke was on him. While he likely
lived to regret this rhetorical move, Hall had chosen words
that were quite commonly used to describe the Mammon59. BRADY & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 30-31.
60. Id. at 110; see A New Kind of Madness, DAILY CLEV. HERALD, Dec. 23,
1856.
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worshipping commercial classes, underscoring just how
crazed they could be made by their own cupidity. The
diagnosis of moral insanity was first introduced into the
cultural lexicon by late eighteenth century “mad doctors”
who sought to widen the legal category of insanity so as to
comprehend non-intellectual forms of mental illness.
Seasoned criminal defense attorneys like Brady were alive
to the ways that this “medical jurisprudence” of insanity
could be deployed upon behalf of their clients.61 Yet in
deploying the plea of moral insanity, Brady and his cocounsel, John A. Bryan were engaged in something of a
pioneering move, as this doctrine was not much used
outside of the context of homicide cases, where it was rarely
successful. This strategy was all the more dicey because it
tended to provoke skeptical reactions, not only on the part
of prosecutors, judges, jurors, and the general public, but
also increasingly within the field of mental medicine,
invariably inviting all manner of slippery slope arguments.
The commentary offered in connection with the Huntington
case by the editor of The American Journal of Insanity may
be taken as a representative example:
It is not always easy to account for the schemes and conduct of a
villain, because villainy is not the normal state of men, although it
may seem to be fast getting to be so. If it is to be palliated by
scientific excuses of moral insanity, or other dubious apologies for
misconduct and crime, the period is not far off when each
particular offense against social law and order will have its
particular form of insanity, real or simulated, presented as a plea
to ward off punishment, and when the whole vocabulary of the
dead languages will be in requisition to provide a nomenclature
adapted to the multifarious iniquities to which men are prone.62

By the defense attorneys’ own admission, the insanity
plea was something of a last-ditch effort, entertained only
after the prosecution had rested and Huntington could not
be persuaded by Brady to throw himself on the mercy of the
court, instead maintaining with an oddly calm assurance
that “he had done nothing for which he ought to be
61. Bibliographical: The Case of Huntington, 14 AM. J. INSANITY 110, 110-15
(1857).
62. Id. at 114.
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punished, and . . . he was sure he would be acquitted.” In
their puzzlement and frustration, his counselors suddenly
recalled a remark the injured party, William Harbeck, had
made to the investigating magistrate, intimating “he
thought Huntington was crazy,” which prompted them to
seek out the expert opinions of “two of the most eminent in
the medical profession.” The doctors’ personal inspection
and diagnosis of the mental condition of the accused
convinced the defense that Huntington’s “reckless and
incautious habit of forgery” was indeed the product of an
“insane impulse,” Bryan analogizing the plea they were
offering to that made by the Prince of Denmark:
Was’t Hamlet wrong’d Laertes? Never Hamlet:
If Hamlet from himself be ta’en away,
And when he’s not himself does wrong Laertes,
Then Hamlet does it not: Hamlet denies it.
Who does it then? His madness. If’t be so,
Hamlet is of the faction that is wrong’d;
His madness is poor Hamlet’s enemy.63

In taking this particular leaf from Shakespeare, Bryan was
guilty of a gaff at least as serious as Hall’s, for he
unwittingly played into the hands of his opponents, who
were already primed to charge the defense with feigning
insanity. They gleefully alluded to warring readings of
Hamlet’s state of mind in the realm of literary criticism,
suggesting that many critics adjudged him “a simulated
lunatic.” Unsurprisingly, the prosecutors favored this
interpretation as applied to a fictional prince as well as the
defendant, hastening to add that the “antic disposition” was
put on in the case at bar for the purpose of covering rather
than detecting a crime—“the greatest known in a
commercial community.” Sounding more than a little like
the newsmen competing to sell papers, Hall puffed his side
63. BRADY & BRYAN, supra note 24, at 106-07.
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of the story, promising to rival not only his opponents’
account, but the works of the great playwright as well: “You
may pile your book-cases with novels and dramas, but you
will never find them as interesting as the transactions that
pass before you in this courtroom. It is a little story, but a
comprehensive one.”64
In view of all this showmanship, these lawyers might be
fairly assimilated to the class of American confidence men,
as they traded on the ambiguity of rules and were prone to
hyperbole and exaggeration, especially when they professed
to be speaking in earnest. Yet upon closer inspection, even
the most theatrical of trials may disclose a great deal about
the laws that conditioned and gave meaning to the moneymaking activities men pursued on the light and dark sides
of Wall Street. Though there were surely gray areas and
many cases of clear wrongdoing that never made it to court,
their significance cannot be fully appreciated unless they
are considered in relation to the statute books and treatises
which set out the elements of crimes of confidence in a
hierarchical order, conveying a carefully delineated and
amazingly detailed moral scheme so far as culpability was
concerned. Such sources crucially shaped the kinds of
narratives the counselors told, offering jurors two distinct
ways of accounting for Huntington’s forgeries as a matter of
their state’s criminal law. And they were even more
consequential in shaping the judgment ultimately rendered,
one that landed the defendant in Sing-Sing and left his
finances shrouded in mystery.
Working within the constraints of the applicable
statute, opposing counselors offered dramatically divergent
storylines, rooted in diametrically opposed assessments of
Huntington’s capacity to do evil. Whereas the prosecution’s
argument was presented in the form of a depravity
narrative that straightforwardly took the defendant’s
actions to have been motived by greed, the defense told a
tale of mental illness, authenticated by putative experts
whose testimony was supplemented by works of medical
jurisprudence, from which the counselors quoted at length.
Accordingly, we find Hall dwelling on the deliberate
64. Id.
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fashioning of the forgeries on the part of Huntington as
evidence of his criminal intent as well as the danger he
presented to all legitimate business dealings while Brady
instead focused attention on the crudity of his notes, with
the implication that the brokers who claimed to be his
victims were either manipulating him or behaving in such a
careless way as to be justly punished by the financial losses
they had suffered. At bottom, it was a question of which was
more laughable: Huntington’s forgeries or the defense of
moral insanity.
The hundreds of pages of testimony found between the
elaborate opening and closing arguments of the attorneys
provided the material for assembling dueling biographies of
the defendant, leaving jurors to decide whether or not the
next chapter of his life—and perhaps the last, given what
his attorneys described as his “delicate constitution, and
highly nervous and sensitive temperament”—would be set
in state prison. The defense played up the haplessness of
their client and rooted his apparent disregard for the laws
of God and man in a hereditary defect, contending that he
descended from a long line of mental defectives, rendering
him incapable of being the “mercenary forger” the
prosecution made him out to be. They contended that
Harbeck and his associates were the prime movers behind
the scenes, these men being motivated “not so much from a
feeling of revenge, as it is from a desire to shield themselves
from suspicion of complicity in these forgeries, while they at
the same time put this defendant out of the way.”65
Displaying an impressive command of the medico-legal
literature on moral insanity, Brady contended that
Huntington presented a textbook case, clearly being unable
to form the intent to injure required to convict him of the
crime of forgery. “You will find,” he maintained, “that the
animus furandi, as the lawyers express it, was no more an
element of these offenses than we find in the lad, who covets
and partakes, over a garden wall, some tempting fruit
which does not belong to him.” Jurors could thus rest
assured that allowing this man “to go forth to the
community again” presented no threat to public safety.
65. Id. at 90, 97.
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Indeed Bryan slyly insinuated that the defendant’s example
might operate as a form of law enforcement:
Gentlemen, remember that should he be acquitted he will go forth
advertised. If he had a placard placed upon his breast and another
upon his back displaying in broad letters the words, “Insane
Forger,” he could not be more thoroughly advertised than he will
be by this trial. There will be no possibility of his doing any
further mischief of this kind for his hand is palsied by the
notoriety of his case. But if the community of money-lenders will
not be on their guard now, we must believe that the Almighty has
purposely made them in his wrath, as insane and deluded as
Charles B. Huntington; and that Charles B. Huntington will again
become, what we think he has been already, a humble instrument
in the hands of Providence, to take from them their ill-gotten
gains.66

While they maintained that the defendant’s insanity
plea refuted itself, Hall and his co-counsel, William Curtis
Noyes, nonetheless labored to distinguish the defendant’s
felonious way to wealth from the mindless pursuits of
madmen as well as the legitimate moneymaking ventures of
(most) Wall Street traders. Maintaining that Huntington’s
life story was that of “a criminal,” and not “an unfortunate,”
Noyes mercilessly attacked the pretenses of the supposed
medical experts, who could not possibly have determined
the state of the defendant’s mind upon the basis of a few
short visits, likely orchestrated after the accused had been
coached to play the part of a fool. In building their case
upon such shaky testimony, he advised the jurors, the
defense was “making a draft upon your credulity” which
Noyes could not believe they would answer with anything
other than a guilty verdict. And so he simply but forcefully
urged them to prevent villainy from becoming normal by
convicting Huntington. “Whilst we cannot change the
current of human nature, while legislators in vain may
endeavor to coerce human nature,” Noyes submitted:
[W]e may at last restrain and correct vice by maintaining the
character of this great metropolis, and keeping it in that proper
check which is the aim of all law. . . . And although strangers may
sneer at this city, which we may proudly call a metropolis, and
designate it the modern Sodom and Gomorrah, if it is ever to be
66. Id. at 98, 110.
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saved I believe it will be redeemed because there may be found in
it twelve righteous men, and they will be those who sit from day to
day in the jury box of the criminal courts. 67

At the conclusion of these proceedings, the presiding
judge, Elisha Capron, issued a fairly mechanical charge.
While he studiously avoided any commentary on the facts of
the matter, his remarks did betray a decided distaste for the
ways of Wall Street, albeit balanced out by a commitment to
the rule of law and pronounced doubts about moral insanity
as an excusing condition. Providing instructions that
conformed to the strictures of the McNaughten test of
criminal responsibility, Capron impressed upon jurors that
it was theirs to decide whether this disease had obliterated
the defendant’s capacity to know the difference between
right and wrong. If it had, Huntington was to be “promptly
restored to his family and to society,” but if it had not, “the
interests of the whole commercial world require that he be
certainly and speedily punished.” Less than four hours
later, they returned with a guilty verdict, which prompted
the defendant to visibly sink into his chair, though
according to reports “his self-possession immediately
returned, and did not again desert him.” Days away from a
planned retirement from office, Capron immediately moved
into the sentencing phase of the trial. By the court’s order,
Huntington was to be confined for the maximum term
authorized under the statute, four years and ten months, in
the famously impregnable Sing Sing Prison.68
III. “CRIME CONTAGIOUS”
“Thus has terminated one of the most remarkable trials
of the day,” reported the Springfield Republican as
reprinted in St. Alban’s Messenger on January 15, 1857,
“and contrary to general expectation, a New York court has
decreed the punishment of a magnificent swindler.” While
the verdict concerned only one of “hundreds of forgeries
committed by the defendant,” this report of a report
conveyed the expectation that “the other [indictments] will
67. Id. at 31, 375.
68. Id. at 440-53.
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not be pressed, the ends of justice being fully served, it is
believed, by the result of this case.” Other newspaper
reports were downright exultant in their renderings of the
outcome of this trial. “A great and good thing in behalf of
justice, public morality, individual honesty and the safety of
society has been achieved in the conviction and sentence of
Huntington, the forger and swindler, to the utmost penalty
of the law,” gloried the self-consciously self-righteous New
York Herald, in an editorial worth quoting at length:
Considering the success of New York financiers, defaulters,
political rowdies, bullies, burglars and assassins, in escaping the
penalty of the penalties of their crimes, through “the law’s delay,”
and the tricks of artful shysters and corrupt officials, we had
reason to fear the acquittal of Huntington upon some microscopic
flaw, some technical informality or a divided jury. The result,
therefore, exceeds our highest expectations in behalf of justice,
law and order. We are disposed to regard it as the inauguration of
a new epoch in the prosecution of rogues, ruffians and swindling
financiers before our courts. The conviction and the full sentence
of Huntington are particularly gratifying in view of the
outrageous defence set up for the criminal by his counsel. “Moral
insanity.” The impudence of this plea stands out in conspicuous
relief, “grand, gloomy and peculiar.” — “Moral insanity!” We have
no doubt that the shocking insolence of this miserable discovery
contributed much to give emphasis to the verdict of the jury and
the sentence of the Judge.

The editor adjudged the defense was “worse than
useless” to the defendant, opining that he would have been
far better served had his counselors pursued “a legal line of
defence . . . to wit: the mitigation plea—that the forgeries
complained of were not in reality perfected, and were not
forgeries in the ordinary sense of the word, but financial
experiments of a ‘confidence man,’ of a bold and dashing,
and singularly romantic and successful character.” Without
pausing to reflect upon the ethical standards the Herald
was effectively advancing—not least by publicizing this
advice—the paper took its leave of the matter of Huntington
the Forger with its expression of “the hope that his case
gives quietus to this insolent dodge of ‘moral insanity.’”69
69. The Conviction of Huntington, N.Y. HERALD, Jan. 1, 1857, at 4, reprinted
in RICHMOND WHIG, Jan. 2, 1857, at 4; The Huntington Trial, SPRINGFIELD
REPUBLICAN (n.d.), reprinted in ST. ALBAN’S MESSENGER, Jan. 15, 1857.
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This hope was not to be realized, in no small part
because papers like the Herald continued to milk such trials
for all they were worth, arguably rendering them
responsible for turning these legal events into the sorts of
spectacles that the editors purported to deplore. The penny
presses were even more obsessed with the subject of crime,
devoting considerable space to all manner of deviant
behavior, from petty thieving to murders most foul. Their
practices excited the concern of more “respectable” news
outlets, who ran stories about “those newspapers which
labor most earnestly to give the earliest and the fullest
details of crime,” repeating a long-standing worry about the
potential of news stories of vice to breed more of the same.
Appearing under the headline “CRIME CONTAGIOUS,”
one 1858 editorial published by the Boston Recorder tallied
the social costs of such journalistic conventions:
Multitudes have been led into crime by reading the details of our
police gazettes, and other sickening receptacles of abomination,
who, but for this mental contamination, would have lived and died
honored, respected, and beloved. . . . Woe to the man that inhales
it; woe to the individual who becomes contaminated with its
poisonous exhalations; woe to him who studies the literature of
our criminal courts, and makes police reports a portion of his daily
mental food. . . . Who ever saw a minute report of a cunning fraud,
an accomplished act of villainy, forgery, theft, embezzlement, that
was not immediately followed by a multitude of similar cases,
excited by reading the description in our public journals?70

Sounding not a little like the agonized writings of
earlier criminal law reformers, as they observed the effects
of public hangings, this editorial concluded that crime
stories threatened to turn offenders like “Huntington, the
forger” into “heroes of the hour.” Yet thankfully a
prescription was near at hand, on this analysis, the paper
enlisting “public opinion” as well as other newsmen in the
task of improving the mental environment, envisioning a
kind of virtuous cycle. “This avidity for the recital of the
monstrous and the horrible in crime,” it was suggested,

70. Crime Contagious, CHARLESTON COURIER, Mar. 24, 1858, reprinted in BOS.
RECORDER, Sept. 16, 1858.
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should be checked by a wholesome restriction by the public
opinion upon the press, and not fostered, nourished, maddened by
such printed histories of horrors. . . . Present as seldom as possible
to the public gaze the sickening accounts of the morbidly insane,
the abandoned and the corrupt, and the mania of crime will be
diminished according.71

Perhaps needless to say, this was wishful thinking, and
while the complex role of newspapers in the cultural process
of capturing fraud is a story for another day, it is perhaps
worth noting, by way of conclusion, what finally became of
Huntington. In the months after he was committed to Sing
Sing, there were periodic reports about how he lived in
prison—stories which indicated he had become a model
prisoner, initially taking up the honest craft of furniture
building, which had been his father’s main occupation, and
subsequently becoming “one of the chief-book-keepers of the
establishment.” However, the contagion of his crime proved
not so easily quarantined. In April of 1857, a story broke
about a stranger called John Scatchard, who had been
arrested on a very peculiar charge of attempted forgery: he
had approached several friends of Huntington, claiming to
be working with an unnamed person in New Orleans, to
secure the release of the prisoner and ensure his safe
passage to Cuba. While claiming at first to be proceeding
lawfully, it eventually became clear that this was to be
accomplished by means of a faked pardon and bogus bench
warrant as well as “a counterfeit telegraph pole,” which he
explained would keep the warden from communicating with
the Governor’s office and finding out the papers were
frauds. His real aim was to extract money from
Huntington’s friends and skip town before he was
discovered. Newsmen had a field day with the whole affair,
since it also implicated Bryan and Brady, who seemed to
have initially displayed some interest in participating in the
plot. The ensuing trial was described by one reporter as
“really interesting and amusing, and might suggest the idea
of moral insanity, although it would be somewhat difficult
where to locate the disease.” Although the defendant was
ultimately found guilty as charged by a jury, they “strongly
71. Id.
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recommended him to mercy” and the presiding judge
accordingly suspended judgment, prompting Scatchard to
“exit from the [c]ourt majestically.” What became of him
thereafter is difficult to piece together, though there are
hints that his real name was James B. Cross and that this
was neither his first nor his last forgery. He surfaced again
in the popular press in 1867 upon being arrested in New
York and taken to Chicago to stand trial on another forgery
charge, by which time he had earned the reputation of “a
prodigy in his way.” What he had done this time is not clear
from the surviving newspaper accounts, though the last
published story on the matter promised more: “It is said
that one-half of this queer transaction is not yet known, and
that some singular developments will be made on the
examination, which will take place at an early day.” The
reading public may have been left in suspense about what
became of Scatchard/Cross, but it is more than possible that
they read about him again without even knowing it, given
the elusive nature of the subject. Like the title character in
The Confidence Man, this imposter may have gone on to con
again, proving the truth of the last words of Melville’s
disquietingly amusing novel: “Something further may follow
of this Masquerade.”72
Huntington the forger was not so fortunate, so far as we
know. Upon release from Sing Sing in 1862, several of his
creditors obtained a judgment against him and an order of
arrest was granted, which landed him in the Westchester
County Jail. Although he petitioned for discharge under
New York’s insolvency law, the court sustained the
objection of his creditors, who insisted that Huntington’s
status as an unpardoned felon rendered him incompetent to
make the necessary affidavit. “Out of the frying pan and
into the fire,” read the last news report of his whereabouts.
Of course, something further might have followed in his
case as well. But from the standpoint of legal history, what
72. Arrest of a Noted Forger, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, May 3, 1867, at 2; Items,
N.Y. EVENING POST, May 3, 1867, at 2; Scatchard, NEW LONDON CHRON., July 10,
1857, at 2; The Alleged Pardon-Forger, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 20, 1857, at 6; see
also HERMAN MELVILLE, THE CONFIDENCE-MAN: HIS MASQUERADE (Elizabeth S.
Foster ed., Hendricks House, Inc. 1954) (1857).
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matters most is that he did not simply get away with his
crimes. While lawyers and showman both had their reasons
for playing with the boundaries of fraud, accounts of the
blurriness of this line have been greatly exaggerated.
Attending more closely to the cases of those brought to
justice will shed important light on the defining features of
white and black lies in Barnum’s America.

